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HABEAS CORPUS
Swain v. Pressley, 97 S. Ct. 1224 (1977).
Henderson v. Kibbe, 97 S. Ct. 1730 (1977).
Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
In its 1963 decision Fay v. Noia,l the United
States Supreme Court held that a defendant
could use the writ of habeas corpus for federal
review of a state conviction, regardless of his
failure to comply with state procedural rules,
as long as he had not deliberately bypassed the
state court procedures. 2 This liberal decision
had the effect of providing federal review for
almost any constitutional claim, and hence, of
increasing federal court interference with state
judicial operations. In recent years, the Court
has displayed a willingness to restore state court
independence by narrowing the scope of Fay,
and the Court has indicated that adherence to
the Fay standard is no longer required. In two
of the principal habeas corpus cases decided
last Term, Swain v. Pressley3 and Henderson v.
Kibbe,4 the Court implicitly rejected Fay by
refusing habeas claims. In Swain, the Court
maintained that an adequate local remedy
could act as a bar to habeas review, and in
Henderson, it ignored the Fay problem by simply
basing its decision on the case facts. In a third
case, Wainwright v. Sykes, 5 the Court explicitly
denounced the Fay rule and relied upon a
different habeas theory to deny a defendant's
appeal.6 The Court refused to apply the Fay
deliberate bypass rule and instead developed a
"cause and prejudice" standard for future ha-
beas considerations. Despite the fact that these
cases clearly indicate the present Court's pref-
erence to defer to state procedure, analysis
1 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2 Id. at 438.
3 97 S. Ct. 1224 (1977).
4 97 S. Ct. 1730 (1977).
5 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
6 The Court did decide a fourth habeas case last
Term in which the defendant's habeas appeal was
accepted. In Blackledge v. Alison, 97 S. Ct. 1621
(1977), the Court permitted the habeas review but
did so on the most narrow of grounds. The narrow
holding in Blackledge remained consistent with the
Swain, Henderson and Wainwright restrictions of Fay
and of the availability of habeas corpus review. See
note 71 infra.
reveals that this movement was not accom-
plished without some difficulty. The cases dis-
play a willingness to restrict Fay, but they also
show that the Court still feels uncertain in its
approach to the Fay doctrine.
To fully understand the three most recent
habeas corpus cases, a brief history of the
Court's treatment of habeas corpus problems is
helpful. The Fay decision represented the
benchmark of expanded federal habeas review
of state convictions.7 Previously, the Court, in
Brown v. Allen,' had maintained that a federal
court on habeas appeal could evaluate both the
procedural and substantive constitutional
claims of a state defendant, with only those
convictions based upon an "adequate state
ground" being insulated from the review.'
7 Article 1, section 9 of the United States Constitu-
tion protects the writ of habeas corpus from arbitrary
suspension; and, via the Judiciary Act of 1867, Con-
gress expanded the applicability of the privilege by
making the writ available to state prisoners. However.
in an effort to assure the states that federal interven-
tion with the state administration of criminal justice
would not run rampant, the Supreme Court origi-
nally held that only issues regarding trial court juris-
diction could be examined through the writ. See,
e.g., Ex Parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913) (The
Court refused to pass upon legality of sentence,
claiming that habeas corpus was not meant to be
used as a writ of error). After nearly 50 years of
limiting habeas consideration to purely jurisdictional
issues, the Court began to consider issues that were
plainly not jurisdictional and to review substantive
claims of convicted state defendants. See Frank v.
Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), and Moore v. Demp-
sey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (In each, the Court considered
one habeas, the influence that a mob had on jury
decisions). Finally, by the time of Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953), the Court no longer considered
the jurisdiction limitation as a problem and instead
just concerned itself with setting the extremes for
when habeas review could not be granted.
8 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (Petitioner applied to the
federal district court for habeas corpus after certio-
rari to review the state supreme court's affirmance
of his conviction was denied by the United States
Supreme Court).
9 Id. at 458.
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However, the Fay Court abandoned the ade-
quate state ground theory and replaced it with
a new doctrine that permitted, almost without
limit, the appeal of a state verdict through the
writ. In Fay, a-defendant relied on the writ to
challenge the use of a confession at his state
trial, despite the fact that he had failed to
comply with a state rule requiring appeals to
be raised at the state level first. The Supreme
Court accepted the writ and claimed that the
federal courts were empowered under the fed-
eral habeas statutes10 to grant relief from any
conviction obtained in violation of the Consti-
tution, notwithstanding the neglect of state
procedure. While the defendant's failure to
meet the state requirement, under Brown,
would have created an adequate state ground
to bar federal review, the Court in Fay deemed
habeas as not so limited. Rather, the Fay Court
believed that review of a state conviction could
be denied only to the applicant "who has delib-
erately by-passed the orderly procedure of the
state courts."'"
As the Court became aware of the desirability
of protecting state court procedures from fed-
eral intervention, it began to reduce both the
scope and implications of Fay.12 For instance,
in Davis v. United States,13 the Court ignored
Fay and developed a new rule governing collat-
eral review of pre-trial defendant errors.
There, a defendant, convicted of a federal
crime, attempted to achieve collateral review
claiming an unconstitutional discrimination in
the composition of the grand jury that indicted
him. The Supreme Court refused the claim
because the defendant had failed to attack the
grand jury's composition at the pre-trial stage,
as required by federal law. The Court referred
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1
4
10 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
11 372 U.S. at 438.
12 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In
Younger, the Court showed great deference to state
court proceedings by holding that for reasons of
"comity and federalism," federal courts should ab-
stain from enjoining pending state criminal prosecu-
tions absent a finding of immediate harm to the
defendant. Central to the Younger Court's concern
was the belief that the overall government would
perform more efficiently if the states and their insti-
tutions were left free to perform their separate func-
tions. Id. at 44.
13 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
14 The Court specifically referred to FED. R. CRIM.
P. 12(b)(2).
and concluded that a failure to comply with
these rules would constitute a waiver of collat-
eral review unless the defendant could show
"cause" for his noncompliance or actual preju-
dice resulting from denial of review.' 5 Further-
more, in Francis v. Henderson,"6 the Court ex-
tended the Davis doctrine to meet a state de-
fendant's pre-trial failure to object to the com-
position of the grand jury. The Francis Court
quoted at length from Davis, using that opinion
to reject implicitly the federal interference with
state procedures that was encouraged by Fay.
According to the Francis Court, "considerations
of comity and federalism" required that the
Davis cause and prejudice standard be applied
to habeas appeals of state criminal convictions.1
7
Davis and Francis, then, stand for the propo-
sition that, notwithstanding Fay, federal habeas
review of an alleged pre-trial error could not
be permitted unless the defendant showed
cause for his failure to abide by the state rule
or actual prejudice resulting from a court re-
fusal to consider the claim." These opinions
represented a limitation to Fay's all encompass-
ing allowance of habeas review, but neither
really purported to overrule the Fay doctrine.
The Court in developing the cause and preju-
dice standards of Davis and Francis relied on
statutory law and, in fact, made no effort to
dispute the Fay deliberate bypass rule. More-
over, the Davis and Francis decisions were de-
signed to meet pre-trial procedural defaults of
the defendant, whereas the Fay defendant's
failure to appeal as required was a post-trial
default. These factual distinctions indicated
that the Fay standard still had to be in existence
for at least post-trial procedural default prob-
lems. Yet, the very fact that the Davis and
Francis Courts both deliberately ignored Fay
may have given the impression that Fay was
resting on a very weak foundation.a"
15 411 U.S. at 242.
16 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
17 Id. at 541.
18 Id. at 542.
'9 To indicate further the weak foundation of Fay
after Francis, consider the decision in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the Court held that
when "the state has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,
the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner
be granted federal habeas relief." Id. at 482. Al-
though the Stone Court made no mention of the Fay
doctrine, the Court's language seemed to be a direct
repudiation of Fay. The Fay rule was developed to
[Vol. 68
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The Court further eroded the foundation of
Fay with its three main habeas corpus decisions
of the last Term. In the Term's first habeas
case, Swain v. Pressley,2" the Court considered
the constitutionality of a federal law21 that de-
nied habeas review of decisions by the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, if the Supe-
rior Court had already provided an adequate
remedy. There, a defendant, convicted of
grand larceny by the Superior Court, applied
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court and asked for a review of the
constitutionality of the Superior Court's trial
proceeding.2 2 The district court dismissed the
writ application, claiming to have no jurisdic-
tion over the matter by virtue of federal law.2u
The Court noted that the defendant had not
exhausted the remedies available at the supe-
rior court level, and hence refused to allow the
writ as controlled by the section 110(g) exhaus-
tion requirement. The district court did not
discuss the constitutionality of the statute. The
court of appeals reversed24 largely because it
doubted the constitutionality of the section
110(g) restriction of federal habeas relief. In
construing the statute, the court of appeals
plainly ignored the section language that re-
fuses habeas review if the superior court has
adequately denied relief, and instead read the
statute as requiring only the exhaustion of local
replace the adequate state ground theory of Brown v.
Allen. Yet, when the Court in Stone discussed a full
and fair opportunity at the state court level, it ap-
peared to return to the Brown standard. To bar
federal habeas review because an opportunity for a
full and fair consideration was granted by the state
court seems to indicate that such an opportunity
represents an adequate state ground for denying the
writ.
20 97 S. Ct. 1224 (1977).
21 D.C. CODE § 110(g) (1973).
22 The defendant alleged that at trial the superior
court had violated his constitutional right to due
process of law because the court had denied him the
effective assistance of counsel.
2 D.C. CODE § 110(g) (1973) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply
for relief by motion pursuant to this section
shall not be entertained by the Superior Court
or by any Federal or State Court if it appears
that the applicant has failed to make a motion
for relief under this section or that the Superior
Court has denied him relief, unless it also ap-
pears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
' Pressley v. Swain, 515 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
remedies before a habeas petition could be
filed.2 5 Unlike the district court, the appellate
court believed that the defendant had ex-
hausted all of his local remedies and thus
remanded the case for consideration of the
merits.
The Supreme Court reversed in a two-part
opinion written by Mr. Justice Stevens. The
Court ruled that section 110(g) did not uncon-
stitutionally suspend federal habeas relief even
though the section permitted a local court to
decide the constitutional questions subject to
review. In the first part of the opinion, Stevens
attacked the appellate court's conclusion that
section 110(g) merely required the exhaustion
of state remedies before habeas could be al-
lowed. Stevens noted that the statute plainly
contradicted the appellate court's interpreta-
tion as its language clearly ordered federal
courts not to grant habeas relief if such relief
had been denied in the superior court. 26 Addi-
tionally, Stevens contended that the statute
could not be limited strictly to the exhaustion
problem, because section 110(g) was deliber-
ately patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 2255.27 Ste-
vens implied that section 2255 gave deference
to the local court proceedings by its creation of
new post-conviction remedies in the sentencing
court. Noticing the similarities between sections
110(g) and 2255, he concluded that the lan-
2' As the court of appeals maintained: "[S]ection
1 10(g) does not affect the jurisdiction of the district
court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et. seq. and operates
only as an exhaustion of remedies provision....
Thus, if the exhaustion requirement is met, Pressley
has fulfilled all conditions to maintaining his peti-
tion." Id. at 1292-93.
26 According to Justice Stevens:
This unequivocal statutory command to federal
courts not to entertain an application for habeas
corpus after the applicant has been denied collat-
eral relief in the Superior Court, is squarely at
odds with the Court of Appeals' view that the
statute deals only with the procedure the appli-
cant must follow before he may request relief in
the District Court.
97 S. Ct. at 1228 (emphasis in original).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) reads, in part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply
for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the
applicant has failed to apply for relief, by mo-
tion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
19771
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guage of section 110(g) was sufficiently plain to
denote the same local deference.
In the second part of the opinion, Stevens
further attempted to give meaning to the stat-
ute's language. The defendant had argued that
section 110(g) unconstitutionally suspended his
right to habeas corpus because it permitted a
superior court review not exactly commensu-
rate with habeas relief in the district courts.
Judges of the superior court did not enjoy the
life tenure and salary protections afforded to
district court judges, and hence the defendant
believed that the superior court judges would
be subject to local pressures not placed on the
district court judges. Responding to the de-
fendant's argument, Stevens referred to the
final clause of section 110(g) and claimed that
this clause avoided any serious question about
the constitutionality of the statute. Stevens
stated that the final clause permitted federal
habeas review if the local remedy was inade-
quate, and therefore argued that the only con-
stitutional question presented was whether the
grant of an adequate local remedy would be a
suspension of the writ. 28 Stevens believed that
such an adequate local remedy would not act
to suspend the writ and noted that the Superior
Court here could provide an adequate review.
Although the superior court judges were not
afforded the federal protections, they had to
be presumed competent to decide constitu-
tional issues .9
Stevens gave no mention to Fay in his Swain
opinion, but he may still have created a signifi-
cant restriction on the Fay doctrine. In Fay, the
Court eliminated the adequate state ground
type of reasoning so that it could develop the
much more liberal deliberate bypass theory.
Yet, when Stevens referred to the adequate
local remedy clause in Swain, he seemed to
have ignored Fay and to have reverted to the
doctrine of Brown v. Allen. The existence of
Stevens' habeas discussion in terms of adequate
local grounds, especially when that discussion
was considered by Stevens as the important
issue in the case, may indicate that the Court
believed that Fay no longer had any value.
28 97 S. Ct. at 1229.
29 According to Justice Stevens: "We must, there-
fore, presume that the collateral relief available in
the Superior Court is neither ineffective nor inade-
quate, simply because the judges of that court do not
have life tenure." Id. at 1230-31.
This conclusion becomes even more evident
when the actual issues confronting the Swain
court are considered. At the appellate level,
the court believed that its task for the case was
two-fold: First, to decide whether the statute
was limited to the exhaustion of local remedies,
and then, to determine whether the defendant
had indeed satisfied the exhaustion require-
ment. However, the Stevens decision went
much further than a mere review of the appel-
late court's action. Instead of simply limiting
himself to a discussion of the appellate court's
two issues, Stevens concentrated on the ade-
quate remedy consideration.
Once he decided on the correct interpreta-
tion of the statute's language, though, Stevens
should have looked at the case facts to resolve
the difference between the district court and
the court of appeals. The district court believed
that the defendant had not exhausted his rem-
edies, while the court of appeals maintained
that he had. Only a Stevens determination that
the defendant had exhausted his remedies
would have justified his consideration of the
statute's adequate remedy portion. In other
words, if it were concluded that there was no
exhaustion of remedies, then the defendant's
appeal simply would have been rejected. How-
ever, Stevens failed even to consider this factual
problem and rather went directly from the
first statutory interpretation to the next. This
obvious omission created one glaring problem
for future applications of Fay. If the facts of
Swain do support the district court's belief that
local remedies were not exhausted, then it must
be concluded that Stevens implicitly restricted
Fay unnecessarily. In essence, Stevens seemed
so anxious to discuss the adequate remedy
section and hence to reinstate the adequate
state ground theory rejected by Fay, that he
may have forgotten his judicial duty to support
every legal inference made in a court ruling.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice
Burger appeared to agree with this criticism of
the Stevens opinion. Although Burger opposed
the Fay doctrine, he believed that Swain did
not present the appropriate factual circum-
stances to restrict Fay in any manner. He noted
that the Stevens opinion considered too much,
and he contended that the adequate state
ground problem should never have been dis-
cussed by the Court. Rather, he asserted that
part one of the Court's opinion efficiently dis-
[Vol. 68
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posed of the defendant's claim and maintained
that the language of section 110(g) clearly indi-
cated that it was designed "to preclude access
to the district court, not merely to assure ex-
haustion of local remedies."30
However, while criticizing the Swain opinion
for its consideration of issues not presented,
Burger fell prey to his own criticism. In at-
tempting to dispute the majority's restriction
of Fay, Burger inadvertently went too far and
presented a subtle attack on the Fay decision.
To support his notion that the majority should
have ended its inquiry with part one, Burger
presented an historical discussion of the availa-
bility of habeas review."1 According to Burger,
habeas review was only permitted in order to
consider whether the trial court had proper
jurisdiction or whether the state had adhered
to its own court procedures. The writ was "not
considered a means by which one court of
general jurisdiction exercises post-conviction
review over the judgment of another court of
like authority."32 The applicability of the
Burger historical approach to Swain was simple.
Since Burger did not believe that the habeas
statute allowed a review of a conviction entered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, he saw no
issue of constitutional dimension raised by the
Swain statute.3 This narrow Burger view of
habeas would thus seem to indicate that, if
presented with the proper factual circum-
stances to review Fay, Burger would reverse its
all-encompassing grant of habeas and return
habeas to only considerations of jurisdictional
or state procedural issues.
In Henderson v. Kibbe,34 the Court continued
its discussion of the habeas issue and, as it had
done in Swain, narrowed the scope of Fay
30Id. at 1232 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
3' Interestingly, in Fay, both the majority and dis-
senting opinions included detailed accounts of habeas
corpus history. Mr. Justice Brennan, for the major-
ity, argued that the history leading up through Brown
v. Allen not only refuted the initial jurisdiction limi-
tation to habeas appeals, but also supported the
notion that any substantive constitutional question
could be raised on habeas regardless of a state pro-
cedural default. 372 U.S. at 399. On the other hand,
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking in dissent, claimed this
history proved that habeas was never meant to lie for
a prisoner whose detention rested on a reasonable
application of the state's own procedural require-
ments. 372 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32 97 S. Ct. at 1231 (Burger, C.J., concurring).33 Id. at 1232.
m 97 S. Ct. 1730 (1977).
without mention of that doctrine. There, a
defendant robbed an intoxicated man and
abandoned him at night in the middle of an
unlighted rural road.3 5 Approximately thirty
minutes after this occurred, a truck struck and
killed the man who was still sitting on the road.
The truck driver had been exceeding the
posted speed limit by 10 m.p.h., and he neither
swerved to avoid collision nor attempted to
stop, even though he had been warned of a
possible highway problem by the flashing lights
of oncoming cars.
The defendant was prosecuted under a New
York statute providing that a person is guilty
of second degree murder when he recklessly
causes the death of another person.3 6 The
defendant's attorney argued that the death
resulted not from the highway abandonment
by the defendant, but rather from the interven-
ing cause of the truck driver's negligence. How-
ever, when the trial judge failed to instruct the
jury on the statutory elements of causation, the
attorney did not object. The jury, responding
to a court instruction that guilt must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, subsequently re-
viewed the defendant's behavior and found
him guilty of the murder charge. The defend-
ant appealed on the intervening cause theory,
but the state appellate court affirmed his con-
viction on the belief that the defendant could
have foreseen that his acts would have led to
the fatal accident.37 The court refused to con-
sider the trial court's omission of the "cause"
instruction, simply because it had not been
objected to in the trial court.
The defendant applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in the district court, arguing that the
trial court's failure to define causation contam-
inated the proceedings.38 The district court
rejected the writ, claiming that the defendant's
attack on the trial court's instructions failed to
raise a question of constitutional dimension
and thus was not reviewable. The court of
Traffic vision was obscured on this road by
darkness and by blowing snow. Id. at 1733.
36 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 1977) pro-
vides that: "A person is guilty of murder when under
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to
human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another person, and
thereby causes the death of another person."
3 People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407 (1974).
3 He maintained that the omission of a cause
definition denied him a full and fair hearing as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(3) (1971).
1977]
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appeals reversed3 9 and applied the Fay doctrine
to this defendant's mid-trial procedural de-
fault. 40 The court maintained that, regardless
of the defendant's failure to object, the trial
court's incomplete jury instructions eliminated
a necessary factor for guilt determination and
thereby deprived the defendant of his rights to
due process of law. According to the court, the
failure to make any objection to the jury in-
structions was not a deliberate bypass of state
procedure, but rather an obviously inadvertent
omission.4" Consequently, the court believed
that, via Fay, the defendant should have been
entitled to federal habeas relief of his constitu-
tional claim.
The Supreme Court reversed and, in effect,
narrowed the scope of Fay once more. The
Court neglected the Fay-based reasoning of the
court of appeals and instead ruled against the
defendant on mere factual grounds. The
Court, per Mr. Justice Stevens, noted that the
jury had been instructed on the definition of
recklessness, equated that definition with one
for cause, and held that the jury's finding of
reckless behavior by the defendant "necessarily
included a determination that the harm was
foreseeable to him. "42
The manner in which the Court decided
Henderson clearly indicated that Fay had been
restricted. For one thing, the mere reversal of
the appellate court's opinion could be inferred
as a dismissal of Fay. Had the Henderson Court
felt bound by Fay, it certainly would have
affirmed the appellate court's careful applica-
tion of that Fay standard. Moreover, the Ste-
vens opinion failed even to mention Fay, hence
creating the impression that Stevens wanted to
restrict Fay only implicitly. As the basis for his
reversal, Stevens chose to focus upon the New
York criminal law at issue and to apply it to the
case's facts. His review led to the conclusion
that the trial court's omission did not infect the
trial in such a way as to violate due process.
43
Consequently, by failing to mention Fay and by
utilizing a factual approach, Stevens was able
to deny a writ application that the Fay Court
probably would have accepted.
39 Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1976).
40 It must be remembered that Fay, consistent with
its factual circumstances, developed the deliberate
bypass rule for habeas review of post-trial errors
only.
41 534 F.2d at 497.
42 97 S. Ct. at 1737.
43 Id. at 1738.
However, by rejecting Fay in such an implicit
way, Stevens may have created problems for
future Fay considerations. Clearly, in light of
the appellate court's reliance on Fay, the Hen-
derson Court should have treated the defend-
ant's failure to object at trial as the central
issue. The court of appeals had presented the
Supreme Court with the right factual circum-
stances to reevaluate Fay. Yet, by misinterpret-
ing the true impact of the lower court decision,
the Henderson Court failed to take advantage of
the opportunity to effect habeas evolution.
During his entire Henderson discussion, Stevens
only once mentioned the defendant's failure to
object, claiming that it is "the rare case in
which an improper instruction will justify re-
versal of a criminal conviction when no objec-
tion has been made in the trial court."44 Thus,
Stevens' refusal to expand on the question
regarding the mid-trial error appeared partic-
ularly disturbing. He treated the factual ques-
tions relating to cause of main importance and
effectually left the status of Fay unresolved.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice
Burger expressed disagreement with the Ste-
vens' handling of Henderson. As he had done in
Swain, Burger criticized Stevens for deciding
the wrong issue and implied that he should
have considered Fay in his treatment of the
habeas problem. Burger first noted that the
writ should have been dismissed simply because
the defendant had failed to object to the in-
structions during trial,45 and then he discussed
the Fay problem directly. Burger recognized
that Fay concerned only a post-trial procedural
error and contended that Fay was not meant to
be applied to the mid-trial defaults. Thus,
Burger seemed willing to maintain Fay at least
for post-trial omissions because such omissions
were unlikely to interfere unduly with state
procedures. But, Burger restricted the Fay ap-
plication and refused to accept the court of
appeals' extension of Fay.
Because Burger, in both Swain and Hender-
son, seemed to be the only justice willing to
consider explicitly the procedural issue pre-
sented by Fay, a comparison of his opinions
demonstrates further his desired treatment of
Fay. In Swain, Burger presented his notion of
habeas history and concluded that habeas was
44 Id. at 1736.
45 "By that failure he waived any claim of constitu-




never intended to be used for reviews of a
state conviction. But, in Henderson, Burger ap-
peared to ignore this Swain view by permitting
Fay to continue for the post-trial error prob-
lems and by not denouncing Fay completely.
These apparent divergent positions may be
explained by considering Burger's judicial phi-
losophy. In these cases, Burger seemingly ex-
pressed the desire for the Court to progress in
the habeas area one step at a time. He wanted
the Court to consider the particular case at
issue in the context of the overall court move-
ment in the general area, and to make changes
only when it was necessary to help clarify the
law. In Swain, Burger may have wanted to
present the historical review of habeas as a
means of proving that the Court was going too
far, too fast. His historical approach may be
viewed as a method of forcing the Court to
stop and reflect on its approach to the habeas
question. Similarly, in Henderson, Burger
wanted the Court to recognize the true issue
involved, while assuring that he, himself, did
not fall into the trap of deciding too much at
once, Consequently, he could dispute the ma-
jority's reasoning, while, at the same time,
continue to develop his own habeas notions. In
Henderson, Burger may still have thought that
habeas should not be used for reviews of state
convictions, but he found no need to consider
that problem. Rather, with the Henderson facts,
Burger could effectively maintain that habeas
should not be used for review of mid-trial
errors, and could reserve a full consideration
of the Fay doctrine for when a post-trial situa-
tion arose.
In Wainwright v. Sykes, " the rest of the Court
finally began to follow the Burger lead and to
reevaluate explicitly the Fay doctrine. There,
the defendant's Florida conviction of third-de-
gree murder was aided by the introduction
into evidence of a confession made to the police
prior to trial. At no time during the trial did
the defendant challenge the admission of the
statement on the ground that he had not un-
derstood the Miranda warnings given by the
policej 7 But later, the defendant applied for
46 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
47 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), re-
quires that nothing said by the individual in custody
be used against him at trial unless his right to remain
silent has been knowingly and intelligently waived.
In Wainwright, the defendant eventually alleged that
his confession was inadmissible because he had been
intoxicated at the time of his revelation to the police,
habeas review claiming the inadmissibility of
his statements because he had not knowingly
and intelligently waived his constitutional right
to remain silent. The district court accepted
the defendant's application when it read Jackson
v. Denno4 as requiring a hearing in the state
court to determine the admissibility of the
inculpatory out-of-court statement. The court,
relying upon Fay, held that the defendant had
not lost his right to assert this Jackson privilege
by failing to object at trial, since only strategic
decisions at trial could create such a bar to
habeas review.
The court of appeals affirmed49 and based
its opinion on reasoning similar to that em-
ployed by the district court. The court first
agreed that Jackson entitled the defendant to a
hearing on the voluntary confession issue.50
Then, the court considered the effect that
Florida's contemporaneous objection rule
would have on the Jackson guarantee of rights.51
As the district court had done, the appellate
court relied on Fay and concluded that the
nondeliberate failure of the defendant to com-
ply with the state contemporaneous objection
rule would not bar review.52 The court simply
and thus could not be said to have knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights. 97 S. Ct. at
2500.
48 378 U.S. 368 (1964) Held that a defendant's
constitutional rights are violated when his challenged
confession is introduced without a determination by
the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate
hearing.).
49 Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976).
50 The court of appeals looked at the traditional
rules of the state's criminal trial practice and noted
that the burden is on the state to secure a prima
fade determination of voluntariness, not upon the
defendant to demand it. Id. at 525.
51 The contemporaneous objection rule considered
here is contained in Rule 3.190(i), FLA. R. GRIM. P.
(1975 Revision). It reads, in part:
Motion to Suppress a Confession or Admissions
Illegally Obtained.
(1) Grounds. Upon motion of the defendant or
upon its own motion, the court shall suppress
any confession or admission obtained illegally
from the defendant.
(2) Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall
be made prior to trial unless opportunity there-
for did not exist or the defendant was not aware
of the grounds for the motion, but the court in
its discretion may entertain the motion or an
appropriate objection at trial.
52 528 F.2d at 528. The court of appeals also
considered the cause and prejudice test enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 411
U.S. 233 (1973). The court claimed that "[a] major
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remanded to the state level and required the
state court to hold a hearing that would study
the defendant's alleged non-waiver of his Mi-
randa rights.
In reversing the appellate court's decision,
the Supreme Court immediately gave notice
that it was going to reevaluate the Fay doctrine.
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist0
3
introduced the habeas corpus provision of the
federal code' and asked when an adequate
state ground could, under the code, bar consid-
eration on habeas of an otherwise cognizable
federal issue.5 5 The mere fact that Rehnquist
reintroduced the adequate state ground theory
previously rejected by the Fay court indicated
strongly that the Fay rule was on its way out.
This fact was illustrated even more clearly when
Rehnquist answered his initial question with
the contention that "it is a well established
principle of federalism that a state decision
resting on an adequate foundation of state
substantive law is immune from review in the
federal courts.
5 6
Next, Rehnquist gave a brief history of ha-
beas review prior to and including Fay,57 and
discussed the limitation of Fay created by the
cause and prejudice rule of Francis v. Hender-
son."8 He applied Francis to the Wainwright
tenet of the Davis decision was that no prejudice was
shown to petitioner through the loss, or waiver, of
his rights to challenge jury composition .... [How-
ever, in Wainwright], involving the admissibility of a
confession or incriminating statement, prejudice to
the defendant is inherent." Id. at 526-27.
-3 In Wainwright, Justice Rehnquist wrote the opin-
ion of the court; Chief Justice Burger, Justices White
and Stevens each filed separate concurring opinions;
and Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented.
4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970) provides that the
federal courts shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of the State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."
55 97 S. Ct. at 2502.
56 Id. at 2503.
57 It is interesting to note that while Mr. Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the Burger historical view in
Swain, he seemed to have changed his position in
Wainwright. The Burger view had been that habeas
was limited only to jurisdictional questions. In Wain-
wright, Rehnquist seemed to accept the notion that
habeas could include reviews of state convictions. 97
S. Ct. at 2503.
58 425 U.S. 536 (1976). Francis barred habeas review
of a pre-trial failure to object unless cause or preju-
dice could be shown. See note 16supra and accompa-
circumstances to limit Fay even further. Treat-
ing the defendant's failure to object as a mid-
trial error, "9 Rehnquist extended application
of the cause and prejudice rule beyond the
pre-trial stage. Rehnquist did not explain how
or why Francis, and not Fay, should control the
Wainwright factual circumstances. Apparently
he implicitly accepted the interpretation of Fay
given by Burger in his Henderson concurrence.
To solidify the notion that the Fay rule had
definitely been held inapplicable for mid-trial
procedural defaults and that it may have been
dismissed for all purposes, Rehnquist contin-
ued with a stinging attack of the entire Fay
decision. First, he noted that it was the "sweep-
ing language of Fay v. Noia, going far beyond
the facts of the case eliciting it, which we today
reject."6 Then, he pointed to the fact that a
basis for the rejection of Fay was that it af-
forded too little respect for state court deci-
sions. Rehnquist believed that Fay encouraged
federal courts to refuse to honor state contem-
poraneous objection rules and that it eventually
caused the state courts themselves to be less
stringent in their rule enforcements. Finally,
he claimed that the Fay doctrine led to sandbag-
ging on the part of defense lawyers; 61 that is, it
created a process by which the attorneys would
use the state courts merely to try out their
cases, with the knowledge that they could still
get federal habeas review. To support his rejec-
tion of Fay, Rehnquist thought it necessary to
speak in terms of "comity and federalism" and
continue the Burger court protection of state
proceedings from federal intervention.
As might have been expected, the very un-
equivocal language used by Rehnquist in Wain-
wright, elicited a number of diverse responses
from the other members of the Court. For
instance, Mr. Justice Stevens, in a concurring
opinion, believed that the majority's decision
should have been of no surprise, since he felt
that the decision was consistent with the way in
which Fay had been applied by the other fed-
eral courts. However, Stevens really used his
concurrence to indicate that he still was not
convinced that it was the Court's duty to discuss
these habeas problems in procedural terms. It
will be recalled that in both Swain and Hender-
nying text.
59 Rehnquist believed that the state's conteipora-
neous rule required the defendant to challenge the
confession "at trial or not at all." 97 S. Ct. at 2506.
60 Id. at 2507.
61 Id. at 2508.
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son, Stevens displayed the tendancy of deciding
a habeas case on substantive, not procedural,
grounds. In each of these decisions, Stevens
deliberately avoided the procedural issue in-
volved in Fay, and developed his habeas limita-
tion with the use of the case's facts. Similarly,
in Wainwright, Stevens used the same substan-
tive consideration to dispose of the habeas
claim. He simply concluded that the Wainwright
facts did not indicate that the defendant was
prejudiced from the use at trial of the inculpa-
tory statement. 62 Although it appeared that
Stevens did not approve of the continued exis-
tence of the Fay rule, he preferred to follow
his own substantive limitation rather than ac-
cept the more direct procedural method em-
ployed by the majority.
Likewise, Mr. Justice White, in his concur-
ring opinion, indicated that he too did not
wish to adopt the Rehnquist approach. White
believed that the Rehnquist denunciation of
Fay was entirely unwarranted. Therefore, he
utilized the Stevens manner of deciding the
case and dismissed the defendant's claim upon
substantive, rather than procedural, grounds.
White looked at the facts of the case and
asserted that the confession used at trial did
not prejudice the defendant. However, instead
of accepting the cause and prejudice rule pro-
mulgated by the majority, White believed that
an entirely different theory, the harmless error
rule of Harrington v. California,3 should have
controlled. According to White, since the evi-
dence of guilt in the case was sufficient to
negate any possibility of actual prejudice, this
appeared "to be tantamount to a finding of
harmless error under the Harrington standard
and [was] sufficient to foreclose the writ and to
warrant reversal of the judgment." 64 By utiliz-
ing Harrington to prove that Rehnquist had
arbitarily disposed of Fay, White was able to
conclude that Fay still provided a good stan-
dard for habeas availability. 65
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his Wainwright dis-
sent, expressed yet another disagreement with
the Rehnquist position.66 Brennan disliked en-
62 Id. at 2511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
6 97 S. Ct. at 2512 (White, J., concurring).
As White maintained "[t]he deliberate bypass
rule of Fay v. Noia still affords adequate protection
to the state's interest in insisting that defendants not
flout the rules of evidence." Id. at 2512.
' Brennan was the author of Fay and particularly
disliked the Rehnquist limitation ofFay and of federal
tirely the Rehnquist reasons for dismissing Fay
and disputed at length the majority opinion.
Brennan first disagreed with Rehnquist's al-
most complete deference to the state proceed-
ings. According to Brennan, the Wainwright
elimination of Fay insulated state court deci-
sions so much from federal intervention, that
federal habeas review would practically become
a nullity. He noted that, under Wainwright, if a
defendant could not show cause for his error
and the state court refused to accept his habeas
plea, the defendant would be unfairly left with-
out any court in which he could address his
constitutional claims.67 Moreover, Brennan also
disagreed with the Rehnquist concern over
defense attorney's practice of sandbagging. He
recognized that any realistic system of federal
habeas must be premised on the actuality that
the ordinary procedural default is the result of
the negligence, inadvertence or incompetence
of the defendant's counsel. He believed that
very few lawyers actually engaged in the sand-
bagging procedure feared by Rehnquist, espe-
cially since a failure of the attorney to deceive
the federal court in the belief that there had
been no deliberate bypass of state procedures,
results in a forfeiture of all judicial review of
his client's claim. 68
Additionally, Brennan maintained that if
most of the procedural defaults are the result
of attorney negligence, then the Rehnquist rule
would force a defendant to suffer punishment
from the error of his attorney. Disliking the
ramifications of this, he claimed that it was
senseless to punish a defendant for the careless
acts of his counsel, especially since such punish-
ment meant the loss of all court remedies. 69
Finally, Brennan argued that the entire system
of habeas review was left unorganized as a
jurisdiction. Previously, he had defended the Fay
decision against all adversaries. For instance, in Fran-
cis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), Brennan
responded to the Court's restriction of Fay with
extreme vigor. As will be recalled, the Francis Court
developed its cause and prejudice standard by relying
on a federal statute. It neglected even to mention
the Fay rule which it was purporting to replace.
Brennan objected to this cavalier method of limiting
a Supreme Court opinion and argued that if the
Court believed Fay no longer to be good law, "it had
the duty to face squarely our prior cases interpreting
the federal habeas statutes and honestly state the
reasons." Id. at 547 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 97 S. Ct. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




result of the Court's decision. The Wainwright
majority opinion rejected the well-established
deliberate bypass rule, and replaced it with a
cause and prejudice theory which the Court
did not even define. 70 Leaving the terms unde-
fined, according to Brennan, could only result
in judicial chaos when lower courts attempted
to apply the rule.
71
The final Court member to take issue with
the Rehnquist opinion was Mr. Chief Justice
Burger. In his concurrence, Burger initially
remained consistent with Rehnquist by main-
taining that the Fay deliberate bypass rule was
never designed to cover errors alleged to have
been committed during trial. However, almost
immediately after making that predicted state-
ment, Burger expanded the scope of his anti-
Fay notion by introducing a new concept for
Fay application. In Henderson, Burger had
claimed that the Fay rule applied for any post-
trial procedural default problem; but, in Wain-
wright, Burger suddenly changed his mind and
noted that Fay should only be applied to those
situations where the defendant had made the
procedural error himself, unaided by his attor-
ney.7 2 This restatement of the Fay rule could
also be consistently applied to the facts of
Henderson. As Burger correctly noted, Fay in-
volved a circumstance where the defendant
70 Rehnquist had stated in his majority opinion
that he was leaving open "for resolution in future
decisions the precise definition of the 'cause' and
'prejudice' standard." 97 S. Ct. at 2507.
7' The Court in the same session provided a possi-
ble answer to this Brennan concern. In Blackledge v.
Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977), a habeas case decided
just prior to Wainwright, the Court granted habeas
relief from a state conviction. Blackledge could possi-
bly be construed as a Court attempt to give meaning
to the cause and prejudice standard. There, the
Court accepted review of a defendant's habeas claim
that his guilty plea had been induced by an unful-
filled promise of a lenient 10 year sentence, even
though the defendant had not alleged such induce-
ment at trial, as required by state law. The Court
noted that the defendant had a witness who could
attest to a defendant-counsel conversation where
counsel urged acceptance of the plea. The Court
also believed the defendant's assertion that he did
not acknowledge his counsel's influence to the trial
judge because his counsel had instructed him to deny
the existence of any promise so that the Court would
accept the plea. Apparently, the defendant had
shown the Court sufficient "cause" for his actions,
and hence this case might demonstrate the type of
evidence that a defendant must present to indicate
"cause" under the Wainwright standard.
72 97 S. Ct. at 2509 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
committed the default himself by failing to
make the required appeal; while in Henderson,
it was the attorney who had failed to object to
the trial court's jury instructions. Yet, despite
this factual difference, it still seemed strange
for Burger to develop a new rule, in a Term
where he had already proposed a different
rule for the same issue.
Perhaps the explanation for the new Burger
development stems from the fact that he did
not really consider Wainwright the proper case
to restrict the Fay doctrine so rigidly. It ap-
peared that Burger was not convinced that
Wainwright involved a mid-trial error and thus
he refused to join an opinion that limited the
Fay application without a solid base. Burger
believed that Henderson had presented the
Court with the right factual circumstances to
limit Fay on the "trial stage"7 3 type of reason-
ing. Upset over the Henderson Court's failure
to take advantage of the right factual circum-
stances at the right time, Burger wanted to
make sure that the Court would not make a
similar mistake in the future. Hence, he rec-
ommended a rule in Wainwright which could
reasonably be inferred from the facts of Fay
and which could easily be used in the future
without concern over the factual circumstances
and the trial stage involved. Staying ahead of
the rest of the Court members in the habeas
area, Burger used his new rule to avoid the
problem of separating the cases and of falling
into the procedural trap occupied by Rehn-
quist.
As the diverse opinions in Wainwright indi-
cate, that case was the most important habeas
decision rendered by the Court in the last
session. The case has obvious far reaching
ramifications. The Court explicitly returned to
the pre-Fay ideals of deference to state courts
and it held that the Fay doctrine should not be
applied for review of errors at the mid-trial
stage. Furthermore, the broad Wainwriglt lan-
guage clearly indicated that the future use of
the Fay standard for even post-trial procedural
problems is uncertain. To understand the basic
holding of Wainwright and its implications for
the future, the case should be read in light of
several important considerations.
First, the Court in Wainwright finally with-
73 That is, a reasoning based on the differentiation
between the pre-trial, mid-trial and post-trial stages.
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drew from the Francis, Swain and Henderson
tendencies to reduce Fay only implicitly. These
three earlier decisions are deficient for their
failure to meet the Fay issue directly. In these
attempts to develop a new rule for replacing
Fay, the Court should have discussed its under-
standing of Fay and presented a logical attack
on Fay's federal intervention doctrine. The
Court's constant refusal to consider Fay created
confusion for both the conceptual analyses of
the decisions and the predictions of the Court's
habeas direction. Consequently, if it did noth-
ing else, the Wainwright Court's direct consid-
eration of the Fay issue helped to solve the
existing confusion.
While the Wainwright Court may have solved
some problems with its explicit rejection of
Fay, it created other problems by replacing the
deliberate bypass rule with a new cause and
prejudice standard. In their Wainwright opin-
ions, both White and Brennan had maintained
that the Fay doctrine of deliberate bypass
was well-established and uniformly applied
throughout the country. Yet, the Court major-
ity refused to give any indication as to what the
new cause and prejudice rule actually meant.
The majority simply left to the district courts
the task of deciding for themselves what types
of evidence constitute a determination of cause.
Thus, the uniformity that the Fay doctrine had
provided was dissipated.74 Blackledge v. Allison 5
may indicate the type of cause consideration
required by the Wainwright Court. However, it
must be noted that Blackledge was decided be-
fore Wainwriglt and that the Wainwright major-
ity explicitly stated that it would not give mean-
ing to its cause and prejudice standard.7 6 Thus,
71 The Fay Court had carefully defined what it
meant by a deliberate bypass of state proceedings:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with
competent counsel or otherwise, understand-
ingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of
seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the
state courts, whether for strategic, tactical or
any other reasons that can fairly be described as
the deliberate by-passing of state procedures,
then it is open to the federal court on habeas to
deny him all relief if the state courts refused to
entertain his federal claims on the merits-
though of course only after the federal court
has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by
some other means, of the facts bearing upon
the applicant's defaults.
372 U.S. at 439.
15 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977). See note 71 supra.
76 97 S. Ct. at 2507. See note 70 supra.
the Wainwright Court's insistence not to define
its standard may still create the application
problems and judicial chaos predicted by dis-
senting Justice Brennan.
Finally, the Wainwright majority may have
repudiated Fay without legal basis and created
a dangerously weak judicial precedent. Rehn-
quist based his opinion upon the Davis and
Francis decisions. He used these cases to display
a narrowing of Fay for pre-trial procedural
defaults and he even discussed the statutory
justification for those decisions.7 7 What he
failed to understand, however, is that the stat-
utory justification for Francis also applied to
the Wainwright factual circumstances. Wain-
wright involved a pre-trial procedural error,
and not a mid-trial error as maintained by
Rehnquist. The same Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12 that governed the Davis decision
and made applicable to habeas review for state
prisoners via Francis, applied to the Wainwright
situation as well. Rule 12(b)(3) required that
motions to suppress evidence must be received
prior to trial. If not so raised, via Rule 12(f),78 it
would constitute a waiver from which relief
can be granted only upon a showing of cause.
Additionally, the Davis to Francis analogy 9 can
easily be applied to Wainwright, especially in
light of the fact that the state involved there,
had a rule of criminal procedure almost identi-
cal to Rule 12(b)(3). According to Rule 3.190
71 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) requires that "any de-
fense, objection or request which is capable of deter-
mination without the trial of the general issue may
be raised before trial." Subsection (2), which the
Court in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 239 (1973),
construed to include the composition of grand jury,
mandates that objections based on defects in the
indictment must be raised prior to trial. The Court in
both Davis and Francis, used this provision in con-
junction with FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f) to hold that a
failure to "timely" object would constitute waiver,
but that a court "for cause shown" may grant relief
from the waiver. 411 U.S. at 242.
78 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f) reads, in part: "Failure
by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial .... shall
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause
shown may grant relief from the waiver."
79 In Francis, the Court maintained that: "If, as
Davis held, the federal courts must give effect to
these important and legitimate concerns in § 2255
proceedings, then surely considerations of comity
and federalism require that they give no less effect
to the same clear interests when asked to overturn




(i)80 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the motion to suppress a confession "shall be
made prior to trial."
Initially, Rehnquist seemed to recognize this,
as he construed the rule "which in unmistaka-
ble terms and with specific exceptions requires
that the motion to suppress be raised before
trial."81 Yet, two paragraphs later, he con-
cluded that Florida procedure required "peti-
tioner's confession [to] be challenged at trial or
not at all, and thus his failure to timely object
to its admission amounted to an independent
and adequate state procedural ground,' 8 2 pre-
venting direct review by the court. Conse-
quently, Rehnquist, without explanation, trans-
ferred a pretrial default into a mid-trial default,
the net effect of which expanded the Francis
rule unnecessarily. Misinterpreting the error
involved in the case, he created a dangerously
weak foundation for a case which purports to
be a significant obstruction to the Fay doctrine.
While Rehnquist took pride in pointing out the
dangers of the "sweeping language of Fay v.
Noia,''83 and claimed that "[w]e do not choose
to paint with a similarly brofd brush here,
' 4
he seems to have fallen prey to those same
dangerous devices.
CONCLUSION
It is very difficult to summarize what the
Court accomplished in this last Term or to
predict the future of the habeas area. Clearly,
the Court used the three cases reviewed here
to advance its desire for state independence
from federal intervention. One need only look
at the reasoning utilized by Rehnquist in Wain-
wright and his constant reference to the dangers
to state procedures created by Fay, to under-
stand that at least this goal was accomplished.
Additionally, the Court succeeded in imposing
greater barriers to federal habeas review of
state court decisions. The defendant failed to
get his writ application accepted in each of the
80 See note 51 supra.
81 97 S. Ct. at 2506.
82 
Id.
83 Id. at 2507.
84 Id. at 2507 n.12.
three principal cases, and only in the relatively
minor case of Blackledge v. Allison, 5 did the
court grant habeas where cause was shown.
Regretfully however, what the Court did
with these decisions was create further confu-
sion in the habeas area. In Swain, by denying
the writ on the adequate state ground theory,
the Court simply did not realize that it could
have accomplished the same net result by only
considering the exhaustion of remedies issue
presented by the lower courts. In Henderson,
by refusing the writ on factual grounds, it
failed to recognize the existence of the right
circumstances for a proper and principled re-
evaluation of Fay. And in Wainwright, in its
haste to eliminate Fay, the Court misinter-
preted the factual issue involved and hence
developed a rule with dubious precedential
value. Although the Court dismissed the Fay
doctrine in Wainwright with its claims of count-
less Fay weaknesses, it created further problems
by not formally overruling the Fay decision. In
the midst of all this confusion, only Burger
seemed to have an idea as to the correct basis
for overruling Fay. Burger consciously tried to
get the rest of the Court headed in the right
direction, but in each instance, the rest of the
Court declined to follow his lead.
Consequently, at the end of the Term, the
Court was caught in an interesting dilemma.
Wainwright rejected the use of the Fay doctrine
for mid-trial procedural defaults and undoubt-
edly the Court intends to overrule Fay entirely
in the future. Yet, it still seemed unclear as to
how the Court could effectively carry out this
plan. Wainwright gave an indication as to the
methodology, but the faulty basis upon which
it rests may prove to be a hindrance. Moreover,
Burger appeared to have promoted the most
logical approach for eliminating Fay with his
suggestion in the Wainwright concurrence, but
his views have been ignored by the rest of the
court. Thus, while the Court could have cre-
ated a solid precedent with proper considera-
tion of Henderson, the reader now will have to
wait until the next session for the Court to
develop more completely its direction in the
habeas corpus area.
85 See note 71 supra.
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